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This paper critically examines the quality, impact and shortcomings of EU and European 
Indo-Pacific policy papers and strategies. While some European countries and the EU in 
Brussels have issued ambitious Indo-Pacific policies aimed at making substantive and 
sustainable contributions to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains yet 
to be seen whether the reality of actual European contributions to security in the region 
will be able to catch up with the political rhetorical declarations in such contributions any 
time soon (or indeed ever). Leaving aside whether European Indo-Pacific policy papers 
will stand for the ‘big bang’ of a European role in and impact on security in the Indo-Pacific, 
there is no doubt that recent European and EU Indo-Pacific policy papers have above all 
been written and published ‘because of China’ and its aggressive policies related to 
territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Certainly, EU and European interests 
in formulating and adopting Indo-Pacific security policies are also – to put it bluntly – the 
result of four years under the U.S. presidency of Donald Trump. Trump’s often changing 
and (often) very erratic trade and security policies towards China from 2016 to 2020, 
together with his habit of treating European allies like adversaries, have undoubtedly 
contributed to the European decision to formulate and adopt its own independent Indo-
Pacific policies. Donald Trump is gone, but when the EU had an opportunity to consult 
with the incoming U.S. administration led by President Joe Biden in December 2020 on 
respective policies towards the Indo-Pacific in general and China in particular, it chose not 
to. At the time, the EU Commission committed itself to adopting a comprehensive trade 
and investment agreement with China, ignoring U.S. reservations and instead insisting on 
demonstrating what in Brussels is referred to as ‘strategic autonomy.’ However, whether 
the European and EU Indo-Pacific policies will sustainably contribute to EU ‘strategic 
autonomy’ in the Indo-Pacific (and elsewhere) remains yet to be seen. 
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Europe and the EU are setting sail towards the Indo-Pacific. Germany and the Netherlands 
published their Indo-Pacific policy guidelines in 2020.1 France adopted its Indo-Pacific 
strategy in 2018, while Britain followed suit in March 2021.2 Britain, of course, is not a 
newcomer to the Indian Ocean region. Since April 2018 Britain has maintained a naval 
support facility in Bahrain, in addition to what are referred to as its six ‘permanent points 
of presence’ in the Indian Ocean: Oman, Kenya, Brunei, Singapore, Diego Garcia and 
Qatar.3 Finally, the EU too published its Indo-Pacific policy guidelines in April 2021. All of 
this is against the background of intensifying geopolitical competition and rivalry in the 
Indo-Pacific Region, with China at the centre of many of the region’s conflicts. Indeed, 
there is (very) little doubt that Beijing building civilian facilities and military bases on 
disputed islands (such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands) and artificial geographical 
features around and close to disputed islands in the South China Sea, challenging 
Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the 
increasingly frequent presence of Chinese naval military forces in the Indian Ocean have 
motivated the EU in its policy paper to announce what it calls an ‘increased naval 
presence’ in the Indo-Pacific. While this sounds significant on paper, the devil will be in 
the details. Brussels has yet to add the details of what this ‘increased naval presence’ will 
eventually result in: a semi-permanent or indeed permanent European naval presence in 
the East and/or South China Seas or instead occasional (but increasingly frequent) 
deployments of European naval forces in the Indo-Pacific? The German, French and the 
EU’s Indo-Pacific policy papers discussed in this paper announce a more prominent and 
substantive involvement in security in the Indo-Pacific, including a ‘meaningful naval 
presence’ in the region, as the EU’s April 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy paper states. The 
EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy paper mentions a number of issues and areas which Brussels 
will be more involved in but, as is very often the case with EU policy or strategy papers, 
without mentioning many details explaining what exactly Brussels wants to do when and 
with whom in the Indo-Pacific. Policymakers in Brussels and EU Member State capitals 
confirm, albeit still and more often than not off the record, that there is increasing European 
interest in making a contribution to stability and security in the Indo-Pacific due to 
increasing Chinese assertiveness accompanied by successful Chinese attempts to tip the 
territorial status quo in the South China Sea in its favour, and this already since 2018 when 
the EU Council issued its Asia policy paper entitled ‘Enhanced EU Security Cooperation 
in and with Asia’ – a comprehensive and detailed policy paper listing numerous areas and 
issues on which Brussels is planning to intensify cooperation with a number of east, 
 
 Parts of the content of this paper have been published in an edited volume edited by Giulia Sciorati and Axel 
Berkofsky at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) in Milan. 
1 The German guidelines are called ‘Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific.’ The Dutch guidelines are called: ‘Indo-
Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia.’ 
2 For the details of Britain’s policies in and towards the Indo-Pacific, see “Global Britain in a Competitive Age. The 




3 For further details, see Chaudhury, Rahul-Roy, “Understanding the UK’s Tilt Towards the Indo-Pacific,” 
Chatham House Commentary April 15, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/04/uk-indo-pacific-tilt. 
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southeast and South Asian countries.4 These are nothing less than policies to contain 
China, Beijing has concluded. To state that Beijing is ‘not happy’ about an increased 
European interest and presence in the Indo-Pacific in general and the envisioned 
‘meaningful naval presence’ is putting it mildly. China’s so-called ‘wolf-warrior diplomats’ 
use Twitter and editorials in Chinese state-controlled and state-censored newspapers5 to 
express their anger about Europe’s plans to make more tangible contributions to security 
in the Indo-Pacific,6 the sort of anger, aggressive rhetoric and threats that seem to have 
convinced European policymakers that observing (from a safe distance) China building 
military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea, illegally interfering in Hong 
Kong’s political and judicial affairs, oppressing and detaining Chinese citizens of Muslim 
faith in the Chinese province of Xinjiang and increasingly frequently intrusions into 
Taiwanese airspace7 should no longer be an option. Indeed, Europe seems to be prepared 
to act on the (as good as inevitable) conclusion that issuing declarations – alone or jointly 
with, for example, Japan – reminding Beijing to adhere to international law has not led to 
China reducing its territorial expansionism in the South China Sea. In fact, quite the 
opposite has been the case in recent years. Verbally protesting against Chinese territorial 
expansionism did not and does not mean that Beijing has not continued to build military 
bases on artificially built islands close to disputed islands in the South China Sea. In fact, 
recent satellite footage has made it unambiguously clear that in recent years Beijing has 
instead accelerated the construction of military facilities there. A report by the geospatial 
software company Simularity published in February 2021 revealed what is most probably 
infrastructure for radar and antennae mounts as part of a military base on Mischief Reef. 
The Mischief is a ring-shaped coral reef located roughly 250 away from the Philippines 
and has been occupied by China since 1995, the kind of reef that China cannot legitimately 
claim as part of its territory as stipulated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
2016. In fact, the PCA ruled that the Mischief Reef is located within the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and therefore cannot be claimed by China.8 Other satellite 
pictures taken in March 2021 reveal that China has reclaimed land to extend Subi Reef in 
and around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Photos taken by the space 
technology company Maxar show the land added to Subi Reef, which is also claimed by 
 
4 See “Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia,” Council of the European Union, Brussels May 28, 
2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35456/st09265-re01-en18.pdf. 
5 In essence all of China’s newspapers. 
6 Chinese ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy makes reference to a very popular Chinese action movie series in which 
Chinese soldiers and fighters easily and gloriously defeat China’s adversaries and enemies. The language used 
in the Twitter accounts of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespersons in particular seems to have been 
inspired by the aforementioned Chinese (government-approved) action movie series, language and rhetoric 
aggressively defending China against accusations of all kinds via social media channels which are not 
accessible by ordinary Chinese citizens. Twitter is not accessible by the ‘ordinary’ Chinese citizen. See China’s 
‘Wolf-Warrior Gamble. Foreign Policy is not like an Action Film,’ The Economist May 30, 2020. See also Cheung, 
Rachel and Wilhelm, Benjamin, “Why China’s ‘Wolf-Warriors’ Won’t Back Down,” World Politics Review (WPR) 
April 7, 2021, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/29554/china-s-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-is-here-to-
stay. 
7 See e.g. Taiwan: Record Number of China Jets Enter Air Zone, BBC News April 13, 2021; 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56728072. 
8 See, e.g., “South China Sea: Satellite Images Show China Building Full-Blown Military Bases on Artificial 
Islands,” The New Zealand Herald, February 21, 2021, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/south-china-sea-
satellite-images-show-china-building-full-blown-military-bases-on-artificial-
islands/DAM22R4VYYCKYAZRPRION7ISXU/. 
Europe’s Involvement in Indo-Pacific Security – a Real Role or Still (Pretty) Much Ado About Nothing 
European University Institute 3 
Vietnam and the Philippines.9 Furthermore, since 2014 China has transformed a number 
of reefs and sandbars – often very far from its own shoreline – into man-made artificial 
islands fortified with missiles, runways and various weapons systems. In the Spratly 
archipelago, which is claimed by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and 
Vietnam, Beijing has built 13 square kilometres of artificial islands on top of reefs and rock 
(on which it has deployed missiles). 
Since March 2019 the EU has called China a ‘systemic rival’ and one does not meet and 
talk to many EU policymakers in Brussels these days who talk about successful attempts and 
policies to engage China politically. That said, however, on the record China continues to be 
mentioned in Brussels as a partner in tackling internationally relevant urgent topics and areas 
(these days the global fights against the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change are 
mentioned as areas where Europe and China will continue to cooperate despite all the 
problems and controversies on their bilateral agenda.10 Outside the EU, Western democracies 
are joining forces to remind China (in vain) to respect and abide by international law and 
verdicts on who can and cannot claim land and maritime territory in the Indo-Pacific. In 
September 2020 the UK, Germany and France jointly submitted a Note Verbale to the United 
Nations (UN) urging Beijing to respect a verdict pronounced by The Hague-based Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016. In a case brought by the Philippines, the court ruled that 
China’s historic territorial claims in the South China Sea were illegal and in non-compliance 
with international law as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).11 China, of course, did not amend, let alone reduce, its territorial claims just 
because three Western ‘middle powers’ requested it to do so. In fact, it did the very opposite. 
The aforementioned satellite pictures provide near-unambiguous evidence that China has 
accelerated the construction of military bases on islands the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) has decided are not part of Chinese territory, even if Chinese maps drawn in the Ming 
and Qing dynasties provide Chinese evidence that 95 percent of the South China Sea belongs 
to China. That is as far as Beijing is prepared to ‘negotiate’ on territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea with Southeast Asian claimant countries (or anybody else for that matter), 
‘Negotiate’ as in negotiating something that is not up for negotiation as far as Beijing is 
concerned. If it were any different, Beijing would not be building military bases on disputed 
islands in the South China Sea. It really is that simple and the fact that negotiations between 
China and ASEAN countries on a code of conduct in the South China Sea are all but 
completely defunct is further evidence that Beijing is not in any way prepared to have its 
territorial claims negotiated away by a group of Southeast Asian countries (all of which heavily 




9 See Huang, Kristin, “South China Sea: China has Extended another Spratly Islands Reef, Photos Show,” South 
China Morning Post March 24, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3126656/south-china-
sea-beijing-has-extended-another-spratly-islands. 
10 There are more than 50 bilateral EU-China ‘sectoral dialogues’ operational today, dialogues dealing with e.g. 
regional policy, security, maritime security, education, environment, food safety, agriculture, industrial policy. 
For further details see EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, European External Action Service 
(EEAS) 2020 (no date of publication given), https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-
china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf 
11 See Ramos, Christia Marie, “UK, France, Germany Refute China’s Expansive South China Sea Claims,” 
Inquirer.Net September 18, 2020, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/190953/uk-france-germany-refute-chinas-
expansive-south-china-sea-claims. 
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Defining the Indo-Pacific 
The Indo-Pacific region is comprised of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is home to 
more than 30 percent of the global population. Half of the world’s maritime trade, close to 
50 percent of container traffic and 70 percent of global oil and gas travel through the Indian 
Ocean region. More than 40 percent of the world’s offshore petroleum and mineral 
deposits are located in the Indian Ocean.12 The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is defined differently by 
different states according to their interests and presence in the region. For the ‘resident 
power,’ France, the Indo-Pacific extends from the shores of east and southern Africa to 
the coasts of North, Central and South America. For the U.S., the Indo-Pacific Region is 
significantly smaller, ending at India’s shores.13 The scholar Alan Gyngell argues that the 
Indo-Pacific is a “framing device, not a geographical reality – its proponents shape it 
around their different interests.”14 India’s Indo-Pacific’s version, for example, Gyngell 
explains, is an extension of its ‘Look East Policy’ towards southeast Asia and a concept 
helping to defend India’s geo-strategic interests in the region against Chinese political and 
economic interests and influence in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
the Maldives. For Tokyo too, the Indo-Pacific is above all (if not exclusively) about China, 
Gyngell explains. When Tokyo talks about ‘free and open access’ in the context of its ‘Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) policy, it means unrestricted access to maritime routes in 
the Indo-Pacific in the case of – you guessed it – Chinese attempts to limit and/or block 
free passage through the sea lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific, ‘free and open’ 
access guaranteed by the kind of cooperation and coordination practised in the framework 
of the quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) initiated by then Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe in 2007.15 
Setting Sail(s) 
The EU’s 27 Member States are exporting roughly 35 percent of their exports to the Indo-
Pacific. 90 percent of these exports ship through the Indian and Pacific Oceans.16 Europe 
and the U.S. under President Joe Biden agree on who is the elephant in the room and 
nowadays there is very little – if any – talk of engaging China politically. For their part, 
European countries have found that China really is a kind of ‘systemic rival,’ as the EU 
has called the country since March 2019: a dictatorship the approaches of which to 
international politics and security are so fundamentally different from EU approaches that 
 
12 See, e.g., Timothy Doyle, “Blue Economy and the Ocean Rim,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 14, 
2018, pp. 1-6; Iyer, Gayathri, “Mega-ships in the Indian Ocean: Evaluating the Impact and Exploring Littoral 
Cooperation,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 204, Observer Research Foundation July 2019, 
https://www.orfonline.org/research/mega-ships-in-the-indian-ocean-evaluating-the-impact-and-exploring-
littoral-cooperation-53235/. 
13 See Grare, Frederic, “France, the Other Indo-Pacific Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
October 21, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/21/france-other-indo-pacific-power-pub-83000. 
14 See Gyngell, Alan, “To Each their own Indo-Pacific,” EastAsiaForum May 23, 2018, 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/23/to-each-their-own-indo-
pacific/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter2018-05-27. 
15 For further details, see, e.g., Buchan, Patrick Gerard and Rimland, Benjamin “Defining the Diamond: The Past, 
Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) March 16, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-
quadrilateral-security-dialogue. 
16 Mohan, Garima, “A European Approach to the Indo-Pacific?,” Global Public Policy Institute August 20, 2020, 
https://www.gppi.net/2020/08/20/a-european-approach-to-the-indo-pacific. 
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cooperation in international politics and security is an illusion more than anything else. 
Certainly, policymakers in EU Member States continue to reserve the right to decide – 
without consulting EU policymakers and institutions – the extent to which they are 
prepared to mention China in the context of a ‘systemic rivalry.’ The occasional inner-
European differences on how and to what extent to confront China upfront on its 
oppressive domestic and aggressive and expansionist policies aside, the UK and France 
are envisioning concrete security cooperation on the ground with Washington, Tokyo, 
Delhi and Canberra in the framework of the aforementioned Quad. In April 2021, for 
example, the four Quad countries – the US, India, Australia and Japan – joined a France-
led naval drill in the Bay of Bengal.17 The French La Perouse18 exercise was first 
conducted in 2019 and is part of what is referred to as ‘Quad Plus’ exercises. Pankaj Jha, 
the former deputy director of India’s National Security Council Secretariat and today 
professor of defence and strategic studies at O.P. Jindal Global University, argues that 
France increasing its naval engagement with the Quad is also a reaction to China 
searching for mineral resources in waters around French territories in the Indian Ocean. 
“France has been aware of the fact that the Chinese have been making certain under sea 
moves [scavenging for minerals and resources], particularly in French territories in the 
Indian Ocean, so they wanted to do something that acts as a deterrent and also as a 
collaborative effort,” he is cited as saying in an interview with the paper Nikkei Asia.19 
Furthermore, British defence planners are envisioning increasing naval coordination and 
collaboration with India and Japan as part of what is referred to as ‘minilaterals’ between 
like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This as part of the UK’s so-called ‘tilt’ to 
the Indo-Pacific announced in 2021.20 
Calling a Spade a Spade 
While Beijing might interpret Paris and London joining the Quad countries conducting 
military exercises in the Indo-Pacific as European countries joining US-driven China 
containment policies, conducting military manoeuvres among like-minded democracies 
protecting their common economic and security interests is not unusual, especially when 
there is a consensus that there is in essence one country that their economic and security 
interests must be defended against. This is where straightforwardness should be injected 
into the discourse: China constantly complains21 about containment directed against it 
while refusing to accept (but certainly understanding) that Quad military exercises would 
not take place if it were not for Chinese aggressive territorial expansionism. Satellite 
pictures made public by European Space Imaging in March 2018 provide unambiguous 
evidence that China has built military bases on the disputed Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea,22 bases which would pose a direct threat to the safety of sea lanes of 
 
17 See Sharma, Kiran and Penne-Lassus, Mailys, “France to Lead Quad Naval Drill in Indo-Pacific Challenge to 
China,” Nikkei Asia April 2, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/France-to-
lead-Quad-naval-drill-in-Indo-Pacific-challenge-to-China. 
18 Named after an 18th century French explorer and naval officer. 
19 Cited in Sharma, Kiran and Mailys, Penne-Lassus. 
20 See, e.g., Mahima Duggal, “The Case for a Britain-India-Japan Trilateral,” Council on Geostrategy May 21, 
2021, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/the-case-for-a-britain-india-japan-trilateral/. 
21 By means of, e.g., the above-mentioned Chinese ‘wolf-warriors.’ 
22 See Bishton, Daniel, “Spratly Islands Military Bases Revealed” Spatial Source, March 6, 2018, 
https://www.spatialsource.com.au/gis-data/satellite-images-reveal-completed-military-bases-spratly-islands. 
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communication if and when Beijing decided to use them. Furthermore, Beijing continues 
to challenge the legitimacy of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China 
Sea23 and is sailing more and more frequently into the Indian Ocean and building up 
economic and military relations with countries such as India’s arch-enemy Pakistan and 
recipients of large-scale Chinese investments such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Of 
course, none of this comes for free. Sri Lanka, for example, owes China more money than 
it will ever be able to repay. This is how Beijing was able to pressure Sri Lanka into granting 
China territorial concessions in return for debt reduction – bad old Chinese ‘debt trap’ 
diplomacy, which is bound to increase the more China invests in poor developing countries 
(in Asia, Africa and elsewhere).24 
About the Money 
Will Europe now begin making its presence felt in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea 
and the East China Sea and consider the possibility of patrolling disputed Asian territorial 
waters and helping like-minded nations (Japan, India and Australia) keep Chinese 
territorial expansionism and ambitions in check? While only until recently EU policymakers 
and officials insisted that EU and European naval forces jointly patrolling the East and 
South China Seas was unrealistic, Brussels’s ‘meaningful naval presence’ in the Indo-
Pacific suggests that it now no longer categorically excludes the possibility of European 
naval vessels joining others – like the Quad countries – in patrolling international Asian 
waters which Beijing (wrongly) insists are part of Chinese territory. However, when exactly 
the European ‘meaningful naval presence in the Indo-Pacific’ will result in joint European-
US or joint European-Japanese naval patrols in the East China and/or South China Seas 
remains to be seen. There is always money to be made (or not) in China, and Beijing’s 
policymakers were in the past more than once able to count on European reluctance or 
indeed refusals to put human rights, freedom of speech and other, for China, 
‘controversial’ issues at the top of the agenda of bilateral encounters with China in order 
not to jeopardise business and investment interests, which – as the recent past has shown 
– are in danger of being jeopardised should human rights be discussed for more than 10 
seconds in a very general-sounding manner or in a half sentence uttered by European 
 
The images show a deep water port, aerodromes, hangars, military barracks, communications infrastructure 
and a 2.7 km long runway on the Subi and Mischief reefs. See also James Griffith, “Beijing may have built bases 
in the South China Sea, but that doesn’t mean it can defend them, report claims” CNN December 7, 2020, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/07/china/south-china-sea-bases-military-intl-hnk/index.html. 
23 The Senkaku Islands have de facto been part of Japanese territory since the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-
1895. China claims that the islands (which are referred to as the Diaoyu Islands in China) have always been 
part of Chinese territory, while Tokyo maintains that they were ‘terra nullius’ when Tokyo annexed them in 1895. 
Because the Senkaku Islands were not part of the territories Japan was obliged render to China (or anybody 
else) with the adoption of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Tokyo maintains that the islands continue 
to belong to Japan. China is contesting the Japanese affirmation that the islands did not belong to anybody 
when Tokyo annexed them in 1895. Instead, Beijing claims that the islands were an integral part of the Chinese 
Empire at the time, islands Japan should have rendered to China after World War II, Beijing insists. Instead, the 
Senkaku Islands were (together with the island of Okinawa) formally returned to Japanese sovereignty in May 
1972. The islands have been under US administration since the adoption of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 
1951. 
24 In 2017, in a 99-year lease the Sri Lankan Hambanthota Harbour was given to China Merchants Port Holding, 
a Chinese state-owned company. The Sri Lankan government granted the lease in order to reduce the debt it 
owed China deriving from previous loans. For details, see Abi-Habib, Maria, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough 
up a Port,” New York Times June 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-
port.html. 
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policymakers during official encounters. Consequently, Beijing’s policymakers must have 
cheered when Europe’s trade and investment ties with China made it to the top of the 
bilateral agenda at the end of 2020. On 30 December, the EU and China signed their long-
awaited bilateral trade and investment agreement – the EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (CAI), which had been negotiated on since 2014.25 The bilateral 
trade agreement made it very clear that the German-led EU Commission decided in 
December of last year to let (above all German) business rule over principles, taking at 
face value implausible assurances that Beijing will abide by international labour rights 
standards. Beijing’s previously categorical refusal to abide by these standards had been 
the last stumbling block before the signing of the agreement. The CAI, however, merely 
stipulates that Beijing will “make continued and sustained efforts” to ratify the International 
Labour Organisation’s (ILO) labour protection conventions, a de facto free pass for China 
not to do anything about labour rights as the agreement does not in any way legally oblige 
it to do so.26 Chinese scholars have no illusions either about the fact that China will not 
address domestic labour conditions just because it made a half-hearted commitment to 
the EU to do so. Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in Beijing, for example, concludes that 
Beijing ratifying ILO labour conventions is quite simply not going to take place: “On labour 
it is impossible for China to agree. Can you imagine China with independent labour 
unions?” Shi said in an interview with the Financial Times on 2 January 2021. No, indeed 
we cannot and the EU Commission officials too must have been aware that the words 
‘China’ and ‘ILO labour conventions’ do not – to put it bluntly - sit well together in the same 
sentence.27 However, in retrospect it is next to completely incomprehensible why the EU 
Commission agreed to trust Beijing on its (very) half-hearted commitment to make efforts 
to comply with ILO labour standards.28  
In fact, the EU Commission’s decision to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt, i.e. naively 
believing that Beijing was prepared to work towards endorsing and adopting ILO labour 
conventions, when it agreed to sign the CAI in late December 2020 is for the agreement’s 
critics the confirmation that the EU Commission allowed its global geopolitical credibility to be 
reduced enormously29 in return for what European multinational companies hope will result in 
less complicated and more substantive access to the Chinese market, including the 
government procurement and financial markets. German policymakers – with the support of 
(or indeed under pressure from) Siemens, Volkswagen30 and other German multinational 
corporations with very significant long-term investments in China – all supported the trade 
 
25 See, e.g., Brunsden, Jim, Khan, Mehreen and Peel, Michael, “EU Hails China Deal despite Risk of Conflict with 
Biden White House,” Financial Times December 30, 2020. Also see Brunsden, Jim, Peel, Michael and Fleming, 
Sam, “Human Rights Questions Remain over Brussels-Beijing Pact,” Financial Times December 31, 2020. 
26 See Mitchell, Tom and Mason, Katrina, “Xi’s Trade Deal with the EU Rings Alarm Bells in US,” Financial Times 
January 2, 2021. 
27 See also “EU-China Investment Deal Leaves a Lot to be Desired,” Merics China Briefing, January 14, 2021, 
https://merics.org/en/briefing/eu-china-investment-deal-leaves-lot-be-desired. 
28 As incomprehensible as it sounds and unfortunately is, the EU Commission and EU Member States agreed that 
European NGOs operating in China will with the adoption accept the Chinese request that all European NGOs 
in China must be headed by a Chinese director. Again, how the EU agreed on such a clause in the agreement 
is a mystery to this author as it runs counter to how European NGOs operate in Europe (and other democratic 
countries): they choose their staff alone and without influence and instructions from the government, hence the 
attribute ‘non-governmental’ organisations. Instead, there is next to no doubt that a Chinese director chosen to 
head a European NGO operating in China will be chosen directly by the Chinese government. 
29 The Western press spoke about handing China an easy ‘strategic victory’ at the time. And it really did. 
30 German carmaker Volkswagen, for example, generates close to 50 percent of its revenue in China. 
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agreement with China. This is obviously not a surprise, but despite evidence to the contrary 
Berlin continues to claim that economic engagement with China will favour and promote 
political engagement. In reality, European and Chinese companies are selling and buying 
goods and services from each other and there is no empirical or factual evidence that such an 
exchange of goods and services has facilitated EU-Chinese political engagement. In reality, 
Berlin’s ‘change through trade’31 approach did not in any way facilitate political engagement 
with China and neither did it encourage Beijing’s policymakers to respond positively to 
European requests for it to respect human rights, the rule of law and freedom of speech.32 
Brussels’s December 2020 decision to sign a trade agreement with China at a time when 
Chinese oppressive domestic and aggressive foreign policies were reported in the press on a 
daily basis was all the more remarkable as the EU Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen 
announced in 2019 it would be a ‘geo-political’ EU Commission. The EU’s signature on the 
CAI is arguably the very opposite of a geo-politically smart and/or astute policy move – unless, 
cynically speaking, Brussel’s geo-political strategy was to cave in to pressure from Chinese 
and European business as quickly as possible. Either way, the EU Commission agreeing to 
sign the trade agreement with China handed Beijing an enormous strategic victory and 
confirmation that Brussels allowed business to rule over principle in its relations with China (a 
victory, however, that would not turn out to be sustainable as the EU Commission announced 
in March that the adoption of the agreement is as good as completely off the agenda any time 
soon. This happened when Beijing imposed sanctions on a number of European politicians 
and scholars). From a geopolitical point of view again, the decision not to talk to and consult 
with Washington before signing the trade agreement with China is close to inexplicable,33 a 
Washington governed by President Joe Biden and the same Washington that Europe and the 
EU is (or rather should be) envisioning security cooperation with in the Indo-Pacific (against 
the background of aggressive Chinese foreign and security policies, and those related to 
territorial claims in particular). This was clearly a missed opportunity for Brussels to 
demonstrate its ability to think and act strategically and EU initial attempts to sell its signature 
on the CAI as part of what in Brussels these days is referred to as ‘strategic autonomy’ today 
ring very hollow. In fact, the EU could have demonstrated its mastery of ‘strategic autonomy’ 
if it had resisted pressure from Beijing and at the time probably more importantly from 
European and German multinational companies and had not agreed to sign the CAI at the end 
of 2020.34 Then again, the chances of the agreement passing the European Parliament are 
currently non-existent, mainly because Beijing imposed the aforementioned sanctions on EU 
parliamentarians and scholars in a tit-for-tat retaliation for Brussels sanctioning Chinese 
politicians and entrepreneurs associated with the operation of so-called ‘re-education camps’ 
in Xinjiang.35 
 
31 Wandel durch Handel in German, today in 2021 an empty slogan not in any way reflecting reality: trade did not 
lead to change in China as regards human rights and the rule of law – or the lack thereof – in China.  
32 See also Brunsden, Jim and Yang, Yuan, “Sanctions Row Threatens EU-China Investment Deal,” Financial 
Times, March 24, 2021. 
33 For an analysis of the repercussions of Brussels’ decision to sign the trade agreement with China in de facto 
dismissal of the US, see, e.g., Small, Andrew, “How not to Work with the Biden Administration” 
https://ecfr.eu/article/europes-china-deal-how-not-to-work-with-the-biden-administration/. 
34 For a critical assessment of what the EU calls ‘strategic autonomy,’ see e.g. Richard Youngs, “The EU’s 
Strategic Autonomy Trap,” Carnegie Europe, March 8, 2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/03/08/eu-s-
strategic-autonomy-trap-pub-83955 
35 While there is not necessarily an immediate and direct connection between oppressive Chinese policies in 
Xinjiang and European interests in and policies towards the Indo-Pacific, Chinese repression against Muslims 
in Xinjiang is part of the bigger picture of Chinese domestic and foreign policies which are perceived as 
aggressive inside and outside the region. The overall population of Xinjiang amounts to roughly 24 million. Half 
the population (roughly 12 million) are Muslim Uyghurs. 
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French Indo-Pacific Guidelines 
France’s Indo-Pacific strategy was published in 2018. The self-declared ‘resident power,’ 
Paris explains, is determined to defend French territorial sovereignty in the region: the 
islands of Mayotte and La Réunion, the Scattered Islands and the French Southern and 
Antarctic Territories in the southern part of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, France has 
territories in New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island. 
Overall, 1.6 million French citizens live in the Indo-Pacific Region and about 8,000 French 
troops are permanently based there. France’s relations with its overseas territories are far 
from problem-free – some of them could seek independence from their former colonial 
masters in the future. French sovereignty is currently – sometimes more, sometimes less 
prominently – contested in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, while the governments 
of Mauritius and Madagascar are challenging France over control of Tromelin Island and 
the Scattered Islands (both part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands). France’s 
Indo-Pacific strategy will therefore only be successful, Frederic Grare argues, “… if 
France’s overseas territories redefine their relations with the metropolis to become vectors 
of political, diplomatic, military, economic and cultural influence.” That, however, is only 
one way of interpreting France’s policies towards its overseas territories, and it is probably 
accurate to doubt that everybody in France’s overseas territories is enthusiastic about 
Paris deciding that the population in the territories needs to continue to embrace the 
French cultural and political heritage. Although the 8,000 French troops can probably not 
be deemed a ‘massive’ military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, they are very well 
equipped. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Djibouti, Paris has deployed six Rafale 
fighter jets and four Mirage-2000 fighters respectively. In the southern Indian Ocean 
French troops are stationed on La Réunion and Mayotte islands and they operate two 
surveillance frigates, a supply and support vessel, two patrol vessels and two tactical 
transport aircraft. In the Pacific Ocean, French troops are stationed in New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia, operating two surveillance frigates, each equipped with a helicopter, 
three patrol vessels, two multi-mission ships, five maritime surveillance aircraft and four 
tactical transport aircraft. Furthermore, Paris has 18 resident and non-resident defence 
attachés stationed in 33 countries in the Indo-Pacific Region. Finally, France is working 
with the regional centres charged with the surveillance of maritime spaces and sea lines 
of communication of the region. France has deployed three naval officers in the 
Information Fusion Center of Singapore (IFC), the Regional Centre for the Fusion of 
Maritime Information (CRFIM) in Madagascar and the Information Fusion Center, Indian 
Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) located in New Delhi. Finally, Grare cites French President 
Macron’s speeches on the Indo-Pacific in 2018, in which he spoke among other things 
about the challenges posed by China’s military rise, Sino-US rivalry and tensions, and 
most importantly about what he called an ‘axis of cooperation between Canberra, Delhi 
and Paris.’ In September 2019, Grare writes, Macron positioned France as a ‘balancing 
power’ in the Indo-Pacific. This sounds like an ambitious and indeed grandiose statement, 
but Paris has yet to explain what concrete policies it is planning to adopt to make a 
‘balancing power’ out of France in the Indo-Pacific, unless announcing it will cooperate 
with the U.S. navy in the Indo-Pacific bilaterally or in the framework of the Quad is what it 
understands as ‘balancing.’ Furthermore, the French Ministry of Defence identifies access 
to deep water resources, the expansion of military power projection capabilities, anti-
access/area denial capabilities and advances in cyberspace and satellite capabilities as 
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challenges Paris needs to meet in order to compete with China in the region.36 To address 
these issues, Paris is planning to expand the country’s security ties with Australia, India, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Berlin’s Indo-Pacific Guidelines – Little Substance, Vague and Lacking Focus 
The Indo-Pacific policy guidelines that Germany released in 2020 are not – to put it bluntly 
– the ‘big bang’ of tangible and measurable German contributions to security in the Indo-
Pacific.37 The guidelines talk about increased German security engagement in the region 
through port calls, joint exercises and protection of global maritime trade routes. 
Furthermore, the guidelines call for a ‘diversification of its partnerships in the region 
beyond China.’ This statement sounds awkward, as in reality there are no German political 
and security ties with China that could be referred to as ‘partnerships.’ Instead, Germany’s 
engagement with China is above all aimed at facilitating and promoting the expansion of 
trade and business ties with German companies and investors.38 Moving beyond 
diplomatic wishful thinking and formulas which do not describe the reality of the security 
environment in the Indo-Pacific, Germany’s political and security ‘partnerships’ in Asia/the 
Indo-Pacific Region exist with fellow democracies in the region, such as Japan, Australia, 
India and South Korea, not least due to the fact that security partnerships of any substance 
and consequence between democratic and authoritarian countries are quite simply 
nowhere to be found in international politics. Consequently, Berlin’s suggestion in its Indo-
Pacific guidelines that Germany entertains a ‘partnership’ with China is implausible and 
does not reflect the realities on the ground. In fairness, suggesting (or hoping) that China 
is still a partner despite all the, for Germany (and Europe), very problematic issues on 
Beijing’s (oppressive) domestic and assertive/aggressive foreign and security policy 
agenda is part of what is left of (well-meant) German and European attempts to engage 
with Beijing politically. 
Furthermore, numerous times (more than 60 times) the German guidelines mention the 
Indo-Pacific as an ‘ASEAN-centric’ security architecture. This is despite the fact that ASEAN’s 
role in and actual impact on (hard) security issues and (existing and potential) security conflicts 
in the Indo-Pacific must at best be described as very limited. ASEAN – often under pressure 
from China – typically cites its almost sacred ‘principle of non-interference’ when it chooses to 
not criticise Chinese territorial expansionism policies in a very clear-cut manner. Chinese 
threats of economic retaliation have proven efficient at keeping southeast Asian countries 
(which count and indeed depend on Chinese investments) from becoming too outspoken about 
Beijing building military bases on or close to islands that are subject to territorial disputes 
 
36 For details, see also “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific,” Ministère des Armes France, May 2019, 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/layout/set/print/content/download/532754/9176250/version/3/file/France+and+Se
curity+in+the+Indo-Pacific+-+2019.pdf. 
37 See “German-Europe-Asia. Shaping the 21st Century Together,” Federal German Foreign Office, Berlin, August 
2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-
pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf. For further details, see also Mohan, Garima, “Germany Gets On Board With The 
Indo-Pacific,” 9DashLine, September 11, 2020; https://www.9dashline.com/article/germany-gets-on-board-the-
indo-pacific and Singh, Gurjit, “Germany Takes View of the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 
October 1, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/germany-takes-view-indo-pacific/. 
38 Certainly, Germany’s efforts – similar to those of other European countries – are above all aimed at facilitating 
the creation of a level playing field for German companies investing in China, making sure that they can invest 
in business and industrial sectors as freely as Chinese companies can invest in Germany (in accordance with 
what the EU calls the ‘principle of reciprocity’ when talking about trade and investment ties with China). 
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between China and themselves. This is hardly the kind of ‘ASEAN-centred’ security 
environment Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines describe. ASEAN’s security forum, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), does not get sustainably involved in, let alone resolve, security 
conflicts in the region in general and territorial disputes in particular either. Since it was 
established in 1994, the ARF39 has been an informal gathering of heads of states, not equipped 
with the authority or instruments to make legally-binding decisions. 
Berlin seems to have concluded that the elusive code of conduct between China and 
ASEAN on territorial disputes can resolve tensions and territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea, the scholar Andreas Fulda writes.40 In reality, negotiations on the China-ASEAN Code of 
Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea have not made any progress at all and it indeed 
seems very unlikely that the code could be adopted any time soon (or if at all).41 Moreover, 
such a code has now de facto become obsolete as China is occupying the very islands in the 
South China Sea it has committed itself to negotiate on with ASEAN since 2002. Finally, the 
code will not be signed because China continues to categorically reject UNCLOS provisions 
on the South China Sea, obviously because these provisions – as was the case in 2016 when 
UNCLOS stipulated that China’s historical territorial claims in the South China Sea were in 
non-compliance with international law – do not confirm China’s territorial claims. For their part, 
ASEAN members will not meet China’s requests to not conduct military exercises with outside 
parties as a precondition for Beijing signing a code of conduct with ASEAN. Needless to say, 
the Quad countries in general and the U.S. in particular are meant by ‘outside parties.’42 
Finally, the German guidelines talk about the involvement of NATO in security in the Indo-
Pacific through cooperation with Japan and South Korea (both are NATO dialogue partners 
belonging to a group of countries which are referred to as ‘partners across the globe’43), 
however, without offering any details whatsoever on how Japan and South Korea would or 
could contribute to NATO’s (possible) role in security in the Indo-Pacific. The guidelines 
furthermore mention a proposed partnership with India (India is mentioned 57 times in the 
document). Cooperation on non-traditional security issues, such as climate change, 
environmental security and public health is mentioned in this context. The aforementioned 
Andreas Fulda mentions what Berlin does not in its guidelines: China’s disinformation 
campaigns on social media on Taiwan. Berlin – like the EU – (so far) shies away from naming 
China as the main source of disinformation campaigns on the internet in general and on social 
media in particular (above all Twitter). The guidelines merely mention disinformation spread 
by ‘authoritarian states,’ despite the fact that there is ample evidence of Chinese disinformation 
 
39 The ARF comprises 27 members: the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, 
China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States), 
Bangladesh, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and one ASEAN observer (Papua New 
Guinea). 
40 See Andreas Fulda, “Germany’s New Policy Paper for the Indo-Pacific: Some Change in Tone, Little in 
Substance” RUSI Commentary, September 11, 2020; https://rusi.org/commentary/germanys-new-policy-paper-
indo-pacific-some-change-tone-little-substance. 
41 See, e.g., Hoang, Viet, “The Code of Conduct for the South China Sea: A Long and Bumpy Road,” The Diplomat, 
September 28, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-code-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea-a-long-
and-bumpy-road/ 
42 See also “In the South China Sea, America is Churning Waters Claimed by China,” The Economist, July 25, 
2020, https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/07/23/in-the-south-china-sea-america-is-churning-waters-
claimed-by-china. 
43 Together with, e.g., Finland, Australia and New Zealand. 
Axel Berkofsky 
12  Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
campaigns, Fulda writes.44 Not mentioning Taiwan in the guidelines, on the other hand, 
amounts to Berlin all but completely caving in to China’s insistence that Taiwan is not an 
autonomous/independent country but instead merely a renegade Chinese province – an 
anachronistic (Chinese) assessment which does not reflect reality. This however should not 
have kept Berlin from mentioning Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits as relevant to Germany’s 
involvement in Asian/Indo-Pacific security.45 
German policymakers’ public complaints about China unilaterally altering the territorial 
status quo in Asian territorial waters in dismissal and disregard of international law are similar 
to how the EU institutions in Brussels (minus the European Parliament, which unlike the EU 
Commission and EU External Action Service (EEA) is very outspoken when it comes to China 
ignoring and breaking international law and international treaties it has signed46) approach 
China: expressing concerns (often to no avail) on a steadily increasing number of Chinese 
regional policies while at the same time not giving up hope of cooperating with China in a few 
‘uncontroversial’ areas such as climate change. Not only is this probably over-optimistic (i.e. 
very unrealistic) but the number of ‘controversial’ issues the EU is (seemingly and at times) 
increasingly willing to confront Beijing on is growing constantly. Australia, Canada, the UK and 
the EU have all confronted China on human rights violations, torture, and forced sterilisation 
in Xinjiang, and have all felt the effects on political and trade relations.47 In sum, it is accurate 
to conclude that the German guidelines do not allow the outside observer and analyst to 
identify anything resembling a well-thought-through strategy. Instead, the guidelines read like 
a shopping list of political and security issues in the Indo-Pacific that Germany may or may not 
address in the years ahead. 
French-German Differences 
Mathieu Duchâtel and Garima Mohan write that Paris and Berlin are pursuing Indo-Pacific 
strategies that are not necessarily compatible. While the French policy approach to the 
Indo-Pacific is, as they argue, compatible with US policy goals and objectives in the Indo-
Pacific, the German Indo-Pacific strategy is not.48 The French Indo-Pacific policy strategy 
paper and that issued by the US State Department in November 2019 both list a free and 
open Indo-Pacific characterised by adherence to international law, freedom of navigation 
 
44 Indeed, even a quick glance at the Twitter accounts of Chinese diplomats posted all over the world reveals 
Chinese government propaganda vehemently defending Beijing against anything resembling criticism or an 
‘external’ opinion other than unconditional admiration for Chinese leader Xi Jinping, disinformation featuring 
many false data, facts and information, attempting to discredit those (governments, scholars, international 
organisations, Amnesty International, you name it) who ‘dare’ to criticise China. 
45 Furthermore, history – in this case the Chinese civil war from 1945 to 1949 – created facts on the (Chinese) 
ground a long time ago. The creation of two countries: the PRC and the ROC (Republic of China, i.e. Taiwan). 
46 Like, e.g., the British-Sino Joint Declaration adopted in 1984 guaranteeing Hong Kong political and judicial 
autonomy until 2047. 
47 See Uighurs: Western Countries Sanction China over Rights Abuses; BBC News, March 22, 2021 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162; and Robin Emmott and David Brunnstrom, “West 
Sanctions China over Xinjiang Abuses, Beijing Hits back at EU,” Reuters, March 22, 2021. 
48 Duchâtel, Mathieu and Mohan, Garima, “Franco-German Divergences in the Indo-Pacific: The Risk of Strategic 
Dilution,” Institut Montaigne, October 30, 2020; https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/franco-german-
divergences-indo-pacific-risk-strategic-dilution; see also Gurjit Singh, “Germany Takes View of the Indo-Pacific,” 
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), October 1, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/germany-
takes-view-indo-pacific/. 
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in international territorial waters and freedom from coercion as priority areas.49 Duchâtel 
and Mohan point out that the German guidelines do not reflect similar priorities and neither 
do they provide any details on other possible bilateral or multilateral partnerships in the 
region. In contrast, the French guidelines mention the expansion of bilateral, trilateral and 
multilateral ties with Australia, India and Japan. While this might be true, Paris talking 
about expanding French bilateral or multilateral security ties in the Indo-Pacific is not the 
same as actually doing it. However, Paris’s decision to envision on-the-ground 
collaboration with the Quad is evidence that France is prepared to follow-up on its Indo-
Pacific policy paper with concrete action. France is the self-proclaimed ‘resident power’ 
while Germany has the luxury of ‘only’ protecting its business and investment interests in 
the region (and not German citizens who through colonialism became German citizens 
against their will – next to the annexation of territory, the essence of bad old 
Western/European colonialism). Germany’s naval command on more than one occasion 
in 2020 emphasised that it is able to deploy only one frigate to the Indo-Pacific without 
jeopardising the German navy’s other ongoing missions. This is why cooperation between 
naval forces is potentially very important. Britain’s Royal Navy is willing to cooperate with 
the Quad countries in the Indo-Pacific/Indian Ocean Region.50 France too has shown 
interest and there is little doubt that Western democracies with a naval presence are 
naturally inclined to cooperate with fellow democracies in the Quad framework. It makes 
operational sense for like-minded democracies to cooperate wherever feasible. For now, 
however, the Quad is not an institution but a group of like-minded countries that gather for 
military exercises and consultations on regional security issues. Certainly, it is unlikely that 
the Quad would exist if Beijing did not have and did not act on its territorial expansionism 
ambitions in the East China Sea. Call it deterrence, call it containment, but it is very 
obvious that the Quad exists because of China and its territorial expansionism. 
Berlin Setting Sail & Teaming up with Tokyo 
In November 2019, Berlin decided to set sail to the Pacific Ocean. It announced the 
deployment of a naval frigate to the Indian Ocean in 2020, including a transit through the 
South China Sea.51 The global pandemic, however, prevented the deployment at the time. 
In March of this year Berlin announced the vessel would be deployed in the Indo-Pacific 
Region in August 2021 and would return to Germany six months later.52 The German 
frigate will also reportedly sail towards the Korean Peninsula to join a multinational mission 
monitoring the United Nations sanctions regime imposed on North Korea. On its way back 
to Europe, the German naval vessel will also sail through the South China Sea, albeit not 
within 12 nautical miles (nm) of Chinese-claimed territories in the region, as the German 
government was quick to point out at the time. According to the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), every state has the right to establish what UNCLOS 
 
49 See also Samaranayake, Nilanthi, “Future US-France Cooperation: Think Indo-Pacific. Does Franco-American 
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific have Room to Grow?” The Diplomat, February 3, 2020, 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/future-us-france-cooperation-think-indo-pacific/. 
50 A former British Defence Secretary confirmed this when speaking to the author in December 2020. 
51 See Müller, Björn, “Marine Plant die Entsendung einer Fregatte in den Indo-Pazifik,” Pivot Area, November 26, 
2019. https://www.pivotarea.eu/2019/11/26/fregatte-in-den-indo-pazifik/. 
52 See Leithäuser, Johannes “Deutschland Entsendet Fregatte in Ostasiatische Gewässer,” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 2, 2021. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/deutschland-entsendet-fregatte-in-
indo-pazifik-raum-17224589.html. 
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defines as ‘territorial sea’ to the extent of 12 nautical miles.53 Within this zone, coastal 
states exercise sovereignty over the air space above the sea, the seabed and the subsoil. 
By announcing it would not sail within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-claimed disputed 
islands in the South China Sea, Berlin is giving the impression it has de facto recognised 
Beijing’s illegal territorial claims in the South China Sea. Otherwise, the German frigate 
could or would sail into Beijing’s self-declared 12 nautical mile zone, not recognising it as 
such but instead as international waters. This in turn would confirm that Berlin does not 
recognise China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in accordance with the verdict 
issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. Berlin, however, has decided 
against challenging Chinese illegal territorial claims in the South China Sea. All of this 
unfortunately means that the German mission to the South China Sea is a potentially 
counterproductive exercise as it de facto recognises Chinese territorial sovereignty over 
disputed islands. In the past the U.S. navy has conducted freedom of navigation 
operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, challenging (now officially illegal) Chinese 
territorial claims there. This entailed U.S. navy vessels sailing within 12 nautical miles of 
Chinese-claimed islands. Beijing of course protested every time this happened, which is 
most probably the reason why the German navy has ruled out conducting similar FONOPs 
in the South China Sea. Instead, it has decided that its frigate will navigate on a zig-zag 
course around the Chinese-defined 12 nautical mile zone. In fairness, the U.S. is currently 
the only country conducting FONOPs in the South China Sea, including sailing into 
China’s unilaterally defined 12 nautical mile zone around disputed islands. Washington’s 
Asian allies and fellow Quad countries, Japan, India and Australia, have so far been 
reluctant to join U.S.-led FONOPs.54 That said, however, other countries not officially 
joining U.S. FONOPs does not mean that only the U.S. navy is patrolling the South China 
Sea. Among others, a French submarine has recently been patrolling the South China 
Sea and British naval forces, including a new aircraft carrier, are expected to do their share 
of patrolling there. Berlin, on the other hand, by explicitly and a priori reassuring China 
that it is adjusting its course in the South China Sea according to Chinese (since 2016 
officially illegal) territorial claims, has made an announcement devoid of political courage 
or common sense – a declaration from a government determined to do (almost) everything 
possible to make sure that its navy’s passage through the South China Sea goes as 
unnoticed as possible in Beijing. 
The past has shown that foreign vessels sailing through the South China Sea have always 
and in any event led to Chinese protests and accusations of violating alleged Chinese national 
territory. It can therefore be assumed that even if the German vessel does not sail within 12 
nautical miles of Chinese-claimed land, Beijing will complain in any event when and once the 
German frigate shows up in the South China Sea. This might be the whole point of German 
and European naval vessels sailing into international waters claimed by China in the region. 
There is more indicating that Berlin is worried about Beijing’s disapproval as regards 
German vessels sailing close to or into the South China Sea. Michito Tsuruoka and Hans 
Kundnani cite the concerns of (German) officials in a May 2021 Chatham House commentary 
that a scheduled port visit of the German frigate to Shanghai could further convey the 
impression that Berlin had previously asked Beijing for permission to enter the South China 
 
53 According to UNCLOS, Territorial sea extends to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. 
54 “The Quad is Finding its Purpose, at Last,” The Economist, June 12, 2021, 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/06/12/the-quad-is-finding-its-purpose-at-last. 
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Sea.55 This is because, Tsuruoka and Kundnami suggest, Beijing would indeed not have 
granted the German frigate Bayern to stop in Shanghai if the frigate sailed into the South China 
Sea against its will. Tsuruoka and Kundnani follow up on Berlin’s possible concerns about 
China’s reaction to German naval movements in the Indo-Pacific by pointing out that recent 
changes to the German deployment plan make encounters between German and other 
European naval forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific unlikely or indeed impossible. Before 
Berlin’s Ministry of Defence made these changes, Germany’s frigate could have joined three 
overlapping deployments in the region: the British carrier strike group led by HMS Queen 
Elizabeth II, a Dutch frigate and the French Mistral-class amphibious assault ship Tonnerre. 
These encounters are not going to take place as the German frigate will now travel anti-
clockwise through the Indian Ocean. “So, rather than coordinating with European allies, let 
alone the United States, Germany is doing its own thing – a missed opportunity,” according to 
a German official cited by Tsuruoka and Kundnani. Indeed. 
In early April 2021 Tokyo and Berlin announced they would hold their first 2+2 discussions 
on security in the Indo-Pacific (a meeting of the German and Japanese defence and foreign 
ministers).56 Nikkei Asia was quick to identify a shift in German foreign and security policies 
towards China, accompanied by increased German on-the-ground contributions to security in 
the Indo-Pacific.57 However, this might turn out to be premature. Discussing security in the 
Indo-Pacific with Tokyo is relevant and constructive but it does not mean that the talks will lead 
to German and Japanese navies jointly policing Chinese intrusions in the East China Sea, 
something Tokyo has wanted European countries and their navies to do for some time. If the 
German navy joined the Japanese navy patrolling in the East China Sea, the symbolic German 
contribution to security in the Indo-Pacific would indeed become a very concrete one. However, 
there are obstacles to this taking place any time soon. Sailing towards and through the South 
China Sea on an ‘innocent’ passage, as mentioned above, is one thing. It is quite another to 
jointly patrol the East China Sea alongside Japan’s navy – from a Chinese perspective 
undoubtedly it would be the ultimate evidence that Germany had signed up to U.S.-Japanese 
China containment policies, the sort of corner Germany does not want to find itself in, at least 
for now. 
The EU’s Indo-Pacific Policy Paper (April 2021) 
On 16 April 2021, the Council of the European Union issued its ‘Conclusions on an EU 
Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.’58 The EU policy paper announced what it 
called a “meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.” The exact meaning of 
the phrase and who and what would be deployed to the region and when has yet to 
emerge. Certainly, the phrase “a meaningful presence” paired with “EU strategic 
autonomy in Asia” in the EU policy paper – EU policymakers argue – signals a new 
approach by policymakers in Brussels. Antoine Bondaz of the Foundation for Strategic 
 
55 Tsuruoka, Michito and Kundnani, Hans “Germany’s Indo-Pacific Frigate May Send Unclear Message,” Chatham 
House Expert Comment, May 4, 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/germanys-indo-pacific-frigate-
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56 See Ryall, Julian “Japan, Germany’s First 2 Plus 2 Shows Extent of Tokyo’s Outreach Amid China’s Rising 
Assertiveness: Analysts,” South China Morning Post, April 5, 2021; https://www.scmp.com/week-
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57 See Mizorogi, Takuya, “Japan Woos Germany on Indo-Pacific with first 2-Plus-2 Talks,” Nikkei Asia, April 6, 
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Research in Paris, however, is not so sure yet: “At the moment, France is the only country 
to have a real security strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Strategic autonomy in writing speeches 
is one thing, strategic autonomy in doing things and defending our interests is another.”59 
In the EU’s defence, Brussels’s Indo-Pacific policy strategy paper is more concrete and 
tangible than many previous other EU Asia policy papers and policymakers in Beijing will 
undoubtedly notice that a significant share of what is written in the EU’s policy paper 
regards China and its policies in the region (without ever naming China). Indeed, the 
Brussels guidelines provide ample evidence that Beijing’s policies are the core of what 
Brussels is – at least on paper – concerned about. They state “The Council notes however 
with concern the current dynamics in the Indo-Pacific that have given rise to intense 
geopolitical competition adding to increasing tensions on trade and supply chains as well 
as in technological, political and security areas. The universality of human rights is also 
being challenged.” There is no doubt whatsoever that both “geopolitical competition and 
tensions” and the challenge to the “universality of human rights” are areas and issues 
addressed to policymakers in Beijing. The same is true when the guidelines state that the 
“EU will deepen its engagement on the Indo-Pacific in particular with those partners that 
have already announced Indo-Pacific approaches of their own,” a clear reference pointing 
to Brussels opening up to collaboration with the Quad countries (the U.S., Japan, India 
and Australia) on security in the Indo-Pacific. 
Furthermore, the EU’s guidelines announce it will coordinate its Indo-Pacific policies with 
EU countries that have already adopted individual Indo-Pacific strategies. Like the German 
Indo-Pacific guidelines, the EU’s guidelines also talk about “ASEAN-centrality” and for the 
same reasons this is not plausible and does not reflect the security realities in the Indo-Pacific. 
As discussed above, ASEAN is not the forum that is dealing with, let alone solving, traditional 
security conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.60 While this is not to dismiss the contributions that ASEAN 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum are making to address and deal with non-traditional security 
issues in the Indo-Pacific, they play a secondary role for this paper (security is defined as 
traditional/hard security, i.e. the kind of security that is under threat and challenged when, for 
example, a country is building military bases on disputed islands). The EU guidelines 
furthermore state that the “EU will further develop partnerships and strengthen synergies with 
like-minded partners and relevant organisations in security and defence. This will include 
responding to challenges to international security, including maritime security, malicious cyber 
activities, disinformation, as well as from emerging and disruptive technologies, countering and 
improving resilience to terrorism, violent extremism and hybrid threats, countering organised 
crime and illicit trafficking, in full compliance with international law.” Again, China is meant. 
From a realpolitik point of view, however, China should have been named, also because there 
is ample evidence available that Beijing has been and still is behind a number of cyber-attacks 
and next to Russia is the most active disinformation campaign protagonist in the region (and 
indeed beyond and globally). Naming China would certainly have ruffled some feathers in 
Beijing (and would have led to Beijing threatening to retaliate against what it would certainly 
have called ‘unfounded’ and/or ‘false’ accusations), but it would have sent a message of 
political strength and determination to China. Clearly the EU missed that chance again and 
Beijing can continue to pretend it is not at the receiving end of EU talking about cyber-attacks, 
crime and disinformation campaigns. 
 
59 See Lau, Stuart and Barigazzi, Jacopo, “Europe’s Long Shot: More Warships in the Indo-Pacific,” Politico, April 
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60 The kind of traditional/hard security in the Indo-Pacific that this paper is interested in. 
Europe’s Involvement in Indo-Pacific Security – a Real Role or Still (Pretty) Much Ado About Nothing 
European University Institute 17 
Finally, the EU’s Indo-Pacific guidelines envision cooperation between Europe and other 
countries in the region in the framework of EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions 
(CSDP)., Unfortunately, the EU does not cite any examples and/or scenarios where and how 
such cooperation is thinkable and feasible. In reality, implementing this type of cooperation on 
the ground is much easier said than done. Japan and the EU, for example, have for years 
unsuccessfully tried to institutionalise Japanese contributions to EU CSDP missions, and while 
Japanese military troops have in the past contributed to CSDP missions in Africa and Central 
Asia, these contributions took place on an ad-hoc basis. The guidelines also talk about 
increased EU contributions to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN’s regional security 
forum. Like ASEAN itself, the ARF, however, is not equipped with the mandate and instruments 
to make legally-binding decisions relevant to hard/traditional security in the Indo-Pacific. 
Instead, it is an informal gathering of ASEAN states’ defence officials to discuss regional 
security issues in an informal manner. 
Conclusions  
Beijing changing the territorial status quo on land and sea in parts of the Indo-Pacific and 
deciding that Chinese-drawn maps authorise it to unilaterally claim territory has led to a 
pooling of naval and military forces among like-minded countries. No doubt this is part of 
a China containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific against the background of Chinese 
territorial ambitions which might go (far) beyond building military bases on the disputed 
islands in the South China Sea. As London School of Economics China scholar William 
Callahan has documented in his book China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future, China has 
a plan to reincorporate much of the rest of Asia in a new Chinese empire.61 Aided by 
Chinese scholars,62 retired military generals and (‘real’ and self-declared) Chinese 
intellectuals, Beijing under Xi Jinping may indeed be aiming at re-establishing a Chinese 
empire as big and powerful as that which existed during the first half of the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-1912). In this case, the rest of Asia would be relegated back to the infamous 
‘periphery’ of the Chinese empire, paying tribute to a new Chinese ‘empire.’ Consequently, 
Asian countries today cannot be blamed for smelling plans to re-establish Chinese 
hegemony when Chinese scholars and policymakers boast about China as the ‘Middle 
Kingdom’ surrounded by ‘small countries’ on its periphery. 
Europe’s and European attempts and aspirations to engage China politically and get Beijing 
to respect and implement international law have very clearly not worked. This is not a surprise 
as authoritarian regimes and dictatorships are politically not engageable unless those regimes 
are in need of money and/or financial bailouts. History is our guide. See the Soviet Union, the 
former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and more recently, at least sometimes, North 
Korea. China, on the other hand, needs neither Western cash nor bailouts and has – see the 
cases of Greece and Hungary – been able to buy itself political concessions and silence when 
it has deemed necessary, as was the case a few years ago when Greece and Hungary vetoed 
an EU resolution taking stock of human rights violations in China. If Europe’s goal is to actually 
deter China from treating disputed waters and territories as its own and building military 
runways on them, time will tell whether the French and German Indo-Pacific policy papers can 
make a contribution to that end. As mentioned, the German Indo-Pacific policy paper is quite 
simply too general-sounding to alert Beijing’s Indo-Pacific policy planners and policymakers. 
The options available to Europe to keep Beijing from building military bases on disputed islands 
are limited and have the potential to lead to armed conflict. Blocking Chinese access to 
 
61 For details, see Callahan, William A., “China Dreams: 20 Visions for the Future,” Oxford University Press 2013. 
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disputed islands in the South China Sea through a sea blockade, for example would 
undoubtedly be interpreted as an act of war in Beijing. 
France is a self-proclaimed ‘resident power’ in the region and that has an impact on how 
Paris and Berlin approach the Indo-Pacific. While Germany will continue to have the luxury of 
focussing on its trade and investment ties in the Indo-Pacific, Paris will have to protect those 
1.6 million plus French citizens permanently based in the region. Against this background, the 
French Indo-Pacific policy guidelines are concrete and give readers a good understanding of 
what France and its naval forces are planning to do in the region in the years ahead. The 
German Indo-Pacific policy guidelines are far less tangible, not allowing the reader to 
understand how and to what extent they represent a new approach to the region. Putting 
ASEAN at the centre of German efforts to contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific is a case in 
point and is a reflection of a German ‘realpolitik’ policy approach to China. A country that is 
taking up 50 percent of the EU’s overall share of trade and investment relations with China, 
has chosen to limit its ‘outspokenness’ on issues that Beijing considers sensitive as much as 
possible, at least so it seems to the outside observer. Berlin’s deployment of a frigate to the 
Indo-Pacific region is to be welcomed, but the deployment is bound to be a very symbolic 
contribution – arguably too symbolic and not substantive and credible enough for the world’s 
fourth largest economy and Asia’s biggest European trading and investment partner. 
Furthermore, and probably more importantly, Berlin seemingly taking into account possible 
Chinese opposition to German naval movements in the South China Sea conveys a message 
of political weakness: it does what Beijing allows it to do in international waters in the Indo-
Pacific and is adjusting its naval operations in the region accordingly. 
Finally, Berlin not mentioning Taiwan in its Indo-Pacific policy guidelines looks like a 
conscious decision to not offend Beijing and not be accused of interfering in China’s internal 
affairs (as Beijing refers to anything resembling a critical opinion on China’s insistence that 
Taiwan is not a country but instead a Chinese province). From a regional security point of view 
this is – to put it diplomatically – regrettable and must have confirmed policymakers in Beijing 
that they have nothing to worry about as regards German interference in China’s alleged 
internal affairs. In reality, however, security in the Taiwan Straits and an interest in protecting 
Taiwan from Chinese ambitions to reunify Mainland China with Taiwan by force are not an 
internal Chinese affair but instead a security issue of international relevance. Consequently, 
the German Indo-Pacific guidelines should have mentioned Taiwan and security in the Taiwan 
Straits, not least because the frequent Chinese intrusions into Taiwanese-controlled airspace 
pose a direct challenge to stability. If Taiwan had featured in Berlin’s guidelines, Beijing would 
most probably and in any event have accused Berlin of interfering in internal Chinese affairs 
and questioning its One-China Policy. Then again, maybe it is time to do both, adjusting 
German and European Indo-Pacific policies to the realities on the ground, all of which will 
continue to sink in fairly slowly in Brussels and EU Member State capitals. 
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